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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The jury system is a remarkable institution and an 
exciting experiment in the conduct of human affairs. This 
system had its inception in France during the 9th century 
and was introduced into England after the Norman invasion 
of 1066 A.D. (Winick, I96I).
Use of the jury as an instrument of justice began 
with an order from Henry II, king of England from 11$4- 
1189 A.D., that a royal jury could be summoned in a land 
title dispute. To serve on royal juries men were chosen 
who were acquainted with the facts of a case. Those who 
were unfamiliar with the facts were rejected. When a liti­
gant had found twelve men to swear oaths as a "guarantor of 
veracity" he was considered to have won his case (Devlin, 
1956). The rudiments of trial procedure, the requirement 
of unanimity, and the precedent that a jury consist of 12 
men originated in this manner.
Since the time of the French Revolution and the
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Napoleonic conquest, the scope of the jury trial has de­
clined steadily outside Anglo-American countries. Kalven 
and Zeisel (I966) report that currently 80 per cent of all 
jury trials in criminal cases are held in the United States.
Historically the jury is a symbol of democratic 
government; however, there has been considerable controversy 
over its merit. Much of the criticism of the jury system 
has stemmed from the assumption that it could not be an ef­
fective system since it uses laymen and amateurs as partici­
pants. For example, Kalven and Zeisel quote Dean Griswold 
of the Harvard Law School who, in his annual report for 
1962-1963, recommended the abolishment of the jury in civil 
cases. Dean Griswold argued:
The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the 
amateur. Why should anyone think that 12 persons 
brought in from the streets, selected in various ways, 
for their lack of general ability, should have any 
special capacity for deciding controversies between 
persons? (Kalven & Zeisel, I966, p. 5)-
The defense of the jury system usually becomes a 
sentimental one, and often the system is equated literally 
with democracy. For example. Lord Justice Devlin said of 
the jury:
. . .no tyrant could afford to leave a subject's
freedom in the hands of twelve of his countrymen. So 
that trial by jury is more than an instrument of jus­
tice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it 
is the lamp that shows that freedom lives (Devlin,
1956, p. 164).
Such emotional attacks and defenses illustrate that 
the answers to questions of the relative weaknesses and
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merits of the jury system lie not in impassioned oratory, 
but in empirical assessment of the system and its function­
ing. Many studies of the jury system have been conducted, 
and those which are pertinent to the present study will be 
examined.
Research on Jury Functioning
Marston (1924) conducted the first empirical re­
search on jury functioning. Using simulated juries, Marston 
presented them with both written and verbal evidence. He 
found that written evidence was recalled more readily and 
more fully. In addition, Marston reported that a juror's 
previous professional training and experience are related 
to his skill in examining and determining facts and arriv­
ing at an equitable verdict.
Hunter (1935) questioned jurors immediately follow­
ing their participation in trials and concluded that the 
typical juror does not understand the rules of law, and 
therefore probably does not apply them to the relevant is­
sues .
Hunter's findings were confirmed by Hoffman and 
Brodley (1952) who conducted a mock trial at the Yale Law 
School and also interviewed jurors following three actual 
trials. They concluded that jurors disregard the rules of 
law and experience extreme difficulty in the recollection 
of large amounts of testimony. In addition, they found 
that simply being brought to trial creates a bias against
k
the accused. One juror is reported to have commented "If 
he didn't do anything why is he here?"
In the study by Hoffman and Brodley (1952) jurors 
were asked which of the attorneys (the one for the plaintiff 
or the one for the defendant) they would prefer if they, 
themselves, were on trial. Seventy-five per cent of these 
jurors had cast their ballots in favor of the litigant re­
presented by the attorney they preferred. Such a finding 
suggests that, psychologically, it may be the attorney who 
is on trial. In addition, Hoffman and Brodley reported 
that they found jurors reluctant to tell a judge that they 
are unable to agree on a verdict, and sometimes casting 
lots or resorting to comparable means to break a deadlock.
Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins (1957) conducted mock 
jury deliberations in which they haa subjects listen to a 
recording of a trial. Following this, the subject-jurors 
selected a foreman, began deliberations, and reached a de­
cision. It was found that foreman selection was made quickly 
and casually, and yet his opinion had a decided influence on 
the group decision which was reached subsequently. In every 
instance the foreman selected was of high socio-economic 
status, and was male rather than female.
Studies of the psychology of memory are relevant to 
the understanding of jury functioning, because the verdict 
of the jury is based in part on the ability of jurors to re­
call evidence accurately and fully.
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Dashiell (1935) examined the individual's ability 
to remember details and studied the value of discussion in 
the deliberations of simulated juries. A condition of one 
study he conducted involved a staged incident before a col­
lege class. Two class members were chosen as "witnesses" 
and reported the details of the incident to seven class 
members who earlier had been chosen as "jurors" and there­
fore did not witness the incident. Following the testimony 
of the witnesses each juror recorded his version of the in­
cident privately. Next, the jury held a discussion and, as 
a group, formulated a single version which included only 
those details on which agreement was reached. The two wit­
nesses, respectively, reported 62 and 55 details of the 
incident and made 5 and 8 errors. The seven jurors individ­
ually reported a total of 44 details and averaged 10 errors 
each. In the subsequent discussion, agreement among the 
jurors was reached on 32 items and only 4 errors were made. 
Similar findings were reported when "witnesses" reported 
details of a film to simulated juries.
Dashiell's studies illustrate both the difficulties 
inherent in obtaining objective, complete and factual re­
ports from witnesses and the advantages of group discussion 
in minimizing individual biases and idiosyncratic interpre­
tations of evidence.
Research on Small Groups
Experimental studies of the functioning of small
6
groups are relevant to an understanding of the behavior of 
a jury. For example, Allport (1924) demonstrated a rela­
tionship between individual and group norms. Allport found 
that individual judgments are subject to modification in 
that they converge toward a group norm when several subjects 
make judgments together.
Asch (1952) asked subjects to match lines of various 
lengths and arranged that all but one of the subjects would 
serve as accomplices. These accomplices purposely and unan­
imously gave wrong answers in order to introduce a conflict 
between the naive subject's perception and his psychological 
need to not appear different from the rest of the group. 
Approximately three-fourths of the subjects yielded to the 
implicit pressures of group opinion. Asch reported three 
types of yielding; an actual distortion of perception, in 
which subjects reported they perceived the majority estimates 
as correct; a distortion of judgment, in which subjects con­
cluded their perceptions were inaccurate and those of the 
majority correct ; and a distortion of action, in which sub­
jects voiced the majority opinion with full awareness that 
the majority opinion was wrong. It should be noted that 
this experiment did not permit interaction and discussion 
among members of the group. The fact that all subjects but 
one were accomplices would prohibit both the emergence of 
an experimental group norm such as Allport demonstrated and 
consensus of factual agreement as reported by Dashiell.
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Unfamiliarity or ambiguity of the object being 
judged increases the influence of suggestion on a subject's 
judgment. Sherif and Harvey (1952) demonstrated that the 
greater the uncertainty of the condition, the greater both 
the variability of judgment and the influence of others.
Hare discussed this phenomenon and certain characteristics 
of the group which may have an influence on individual judg­
ments .
. . .an individual is more likely to conform to
group opinion in the following cases: when the object
to be judged is ambiguous, if he must make his opinion 
public, if the majority holding a contrary opinion is 
large, and if the group is especially friendly or close 
knit (Hare, 1962, p. 30).
The studies cited demonstrate the influence exerted 
by the majority upon the individual group member. Another 
consideration is the fact that the group as a whole is vul­
nerable to external influences in arriving at an opinion or 
decision. For example, the influences exerted by opposing 
lawyers have been shown to be related to the verdict of a 
jury (Hoffman & Brodley, 1952). Furthermore, in addition 
to factors such as the unfamiliarity or ambiguity of the 
object being perceived, it has been suggested that many ele­
ments which possibly are unrecognized and uncontrolled may 
have a significant effect on a final verdict in jury delib­
erations (Marshall, I966).
Consideration of factors which influence judgment 
emphasizes the relevance of many aspects of the perceptual 
process. This process is modified not only by group
8
interaction but by all aspects of experience.
Orne (1962) and Rosenthal, Persinger, Vikan-Kline, 
and Mulry (1963) studied types of nonrandom bias which may 
be introduced into seemingly well-controlled laboratory 
experiments. Orne (I962) showed that the subject brings 
certain expectations to the experimental situation which 
may influence his performance. Orne suggested the subject's 
perception of the experimental situation may lead him to 
formulate hypotheses about the meaning of the experiment, 
hypotheses which are independent of the experimenter's in­
structions. The subject's hypotheses may be right or wrong, 
but in either instance they can influence his behavior.
Orne labeled these phenomena the "demand characteristics" 
of the situation. The similarities between the experimen­
tal situation studied by Orne and a juror's experience of 
trial procedures are striking. It seems highly probable 
that a juror would formulate hypotheses about the opinion 
of the judge, other jurors, the "juror role", the defendant, 
and many aspects of the trial situation. Such hypotheses 
might well influence his opinion and the subsequent verdict.
Rosenthal et al. (I963) examined the expectations 
which the experimenter holds regarding the outcome of an 
experiment and showed that results can be biased in the 
direction of these expectations even though the data are 
collected by naive examiners. Such a situation is not 
dissimilar to the circumstances of a trial, and a judge or
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expert witness may be thought of as analogous to the ex­
perimenter. Like the experimenter, they may also bring
certain expectations to the trial situation which could be 
communicated to a jury. The subjects in the studies by 
Rosenthal et al . were not immune to such subtle influences 
and it can not be assumed that jurors are insensitive to 
such opinions even though they remained verbally unexpressed.
The opinion and testimony of expert witnesses and 
prestige figures such as professional persons is an espe­
cially potent factor which may influence judgments in any 
instance and which is introduced into a trial specifically
to assist the jury in evaluation of evidence. Yet these
persons, too, are fallible and subject to error.
Temerlin and Trousdale (I966) studied the effects 
of prestige opinion on judgments of mental health made by 
undergraduate students, advanced law students, graduate 
students in clinical psychology, practicing clinical psy­
chologists and psychiatrists. These groups diagnosed a 
tape recorded interview, both with and without the expec­
tation, created by a prestige confederate, that the person 
being interviewed was psychotic. Although the person being 
interviewed was a normal and healthy man, diagnoses of men­
tal illness ranged from 84% by undergraduates to 100% by 
psychiatrists. Conversely, diagnoses of normality ranged 
from 0-l6% in the experimental groups and from 53-100% in 
similar control groups.
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Temerlin and Trousdale conclude:
. . .the differentiation of normality and health
from neurosis and psychosis may be grossly inaccurate 
when made (a) in a clinical setting, (b) under the in­
fluence of prestige suggestion, and (c) in the absence 
of a generally accepted definition of mental illness 
and mental health. Unfortunately, these conditions 
characterize diagnostic practice in many clinics, state 
hospitals and courtrooms, as formal diagnoses are usu­
ally made without explicit definition of the categories 
used, on the basis of consensus derived from discussion 
led by a clinic director, hospital superintendent, ex­
pert consultant, or jury foreman (Temerlin & Trousdale,
1966, p . 18).
Considerations such as these raise the question; 
when a jury is evaluating the mental condition of another 
human being, to what extent is its judgment based on fac­
tors other than the evidence presented?
As the purpose of this study is the investigation 
of factors which influence jury decisions in sanity hear­
ings, the historical and legal aspects of commitment pro­
cedures merit consideration.
Historical and Legal Aspects of Commitment Procedures
In ancient times consideration of the legal aspects 
of insanity centered around the disposition of property.
All problems related to the care of the mentally disabled 
person were decided by the head of his family. The fact 
that a person did not act sane was sufficient reason for 
relatives to assume legalized control of his person and his 
property. Such control was not contingent upon a judicial 
decree or formal pronouncement of a magistrate; rather, it
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arose directly by reason of his condition.
Throughout the Middle Ages laws continued to re­
flect concern for the property of the disabled and little 
legal attention to his person. Eventually, English laws 
consigned responsibility in such cases to the king and in 
the 17th century, for the first time, determinations of 
mental status were made by a jury of twelve men. If 
lunacy was found by a jury, the incompetent was committed 
to a friend who received an allowance for his care from 
the king.
Community—maintained asylums gradually began to 
appear in England and the United States- In 1774 Parlia­
ment enacted a statute to regulate "madhouses", and a New 
York statute enacted in I788 authorized the apprehension 
and detention of the "furiously madd" and the dangerous.
The standard of "detention of the violent" gradually be­
came outmoded and in 1845 the court acknowledged that the 
United States Constitution prohibits the detention of any­
one against his will, unless he is deprived of his liberty 
by judgment of his peers or the law of the land.
Certainly, legal safeguards governing commitment 
procedures are of maximal importance when an individual is 
being deprived of his liberty and civil rights through com­
mitment to a mental institution. Over centuries, such pro­
tection has evolved from the right of the individual to 
trial by a jury of his peers. These legal safeguards merit
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review and examination.
Civi1 action. Only involuntary commitment pro­
cedures are relevant to the purposes of the present study 
and thus under consideration here. The determination of 
whether a person's mental condition brings him within the 
statutory criteria for involuntary commitment is made by a 
court, an administrative tribunal, or a specified number 
of physicians. Many states, including Oklahoma, provide 
more than one procedure for involuntary hospitalization.
For example, jury trial is mandatory in Oklahoma if de­
manded by the patient. Otherwise, the decision to hold a 
jury trial is left to the discretion of the judge. If a 
jury trial is not ordered, commitment is made by an admin­
istrative tribunal consisting of two physicians and an at­
torney .
The legal criteria for involuntary commitment are 
not similar in all states. They include in various combi­
nations such considerations as whether the individual is 
dangerous to himself or others, the person's need for hos­
pitalization and treatment, and whether his disability is 
such that his own welfare or the welfare of others requires 
the care or treatment available in a hospital. Several 
states may hospitalize anyone meeting the statutory defini­
tions of "insane." The criterion for involuntary hospital­
ization in Oklahoma when no crime is involved is the per­
son's need for treatment.
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Criminal action. The legal criteria by which a 
person's mental status is determined are, at least in 
theory, simple, clear, and concise, and must be because 
the law excuses from criminal responsibility persons who 
are adjudged "insane."
Insanity is a legal concept, the definition of 
which is based upon the famous M'Naghten decision of l843. 
The M'Naghten decision established the test which presently 
is accepted by approximately 30 states as the sole criterion 
of criminal responsibility,
. . .to establish a defense on the ground of insan­
ity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the 
committing of the act, the party accused was laboring 
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was 
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong (Lindman & McIntyre, I96I, p.
332) .
Although the original M'Naghten decision provided 
alternative tests, that is, not knowing the nature and qual­
ity of the act, or not knowing that the act is wrong, the 
most common form in which the M'Naghten test now appears 
is whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from 
wrong in respect to the particular act charged.
The irresistible impulse test, which had its genesis 
in the case of State v̂ . Thomson, 1834, is coupled with the 
M'Naghten test in many states. Nowhere is the irresistible 
impulse test relied on as the sole criterion of criminal re­
sponsibility, however. This test applies to a defendant who 
may understand his act and may be aware that it is wrong but
l4
who, nevertheless, is driven to commit a criminal act by an 
irresistible impulse resulting from a mental condition.
In 1954 the scope of the irresistible impulse test 
was broadened when the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in Durham v. United States held 
that . .an accused is not criminally responsible if his 
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental 
defect." Lindman and McIntyre quote the author of the Dur­
ham decision, Judge David L. Bazelon:
. . .The thesis of Durham is not complicated and
it is not revolutionary. It is simply that juries 
should be told what is known about the dynamics of hu­
man behavior. . .The psychiatrist in the courtroom must 
understand that his function is not to make a legal de­
termination of whether an accused is suffering from a 
mental disease or defect. That is for the judge and 
jury to decide. The Psychiatrist's role is to supply 
the medical data--observed facts or opinions or both-- 
upon which a legal determination can be based. . .
(Lindman & McIntyre, I96I, p. 334).
The Durham rule was an attempt both to remove the 
moralistic shackles of the M'Naghten test and to enlarge 
the scope of the "irresistible impulse" test to include 
acts which result from brooding and reflection. Thus rel­
evant legal inquiry is directed toward medical concepts of 
mental disability rather than conjecture as to the defen­
dant's capacity to make moral judgments.
The criteria which guide the legal processes of 
defining and determining "mental illness" are poorly de­
fined and ambiguous. For example, Ross quotes the "Draft 
Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally 111" which
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defines a mentally ill person as follows;
An individual having a psychiatric or other disease 
which substantially impairs his mental health (Ross, 
1959, p. 950).
In the absence of a definition of mental health such a def­
inition does nothing to clarify the issues at hand and is 
circular and confusing.
A later provision of the Draft Act states that com­
pulsory hospitalization for an indeterminate period can be 
ordered by a court if the court finds that the proposed 
patient :
(1). Is mentally ill, and
(2). because of his illness is likely to injure 
himself or others if allowed to remain at 
liberty, or
(3). is in need of custody, care or treatment in
a mental hospital and, because of his illness, 
lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make 
responsible decisions with respect to his 
hospitalization. . . (Ross, 1959, P- 950).
Ross states the justification for the use of civil 
proceedings under conditions which usually are noncriminal:
The legal profession has emphasized the need to 
guard against "railroading" by the use of procedures 
adopted from criminal or civil trials. A fair hearing 
on notice, the right to counsel, and the right to a 
jury trial are not mere "technicalities", but represent 
principles of justice in dealing with human rights 
which have evolved over the centuries (Ross, 1959, p .
965) .
Thus, the safeguarding of the individual's rights 
would appear to lie in his right to trial by a jury of his 
peers. However, this may not be the safeguard it is assumed 
to be despite the ongoing efforts of the courts to make it
16
so .
The biases and misunderstandings possible when one 
person sits in judgment of another are great, under even 
the best of circumstances. When lay persons are asked to 
render judgment on the mental competence of another person 
the inherent fallibility of such judgment is obvious: Tem­
erlin and Trousdale (I966) demonstrated that even highly 
competent professional persons often disagree in similar 
circumstances.
When consideration is given to the fact that pro­
fessional persons can be influenced in their diagnostic 
judgments by a prestige figure, the question arises as to 
whether the non-professional person, e.g., the juror, is 
similarly influenced by such suggestion.
In summary, there are many potential sources of 
error which may influence jury deliberations and the sub­
sequent verdict. Some of these sources of error lie within 
the individual juror and, by extension, may influence the 
deliberations and verdict of the jury. These might include, 
for example, whatever preconceived and stereotypic notions 
a juror may hold about jury duty, the possible assumption 
he may make of a correlation between accusation and guilt, 
ignorance or misunderstanding of rules of law, and diffi­
culty in recalling large amounts of evidence.
The jury may be influenced unduly by one opinionated 
juror, the jury foreman, or expert witnesses who themselves
17
are vulnerable to error. The courts attempt to safeguard 
the rights of the individual by utilizing the knowledge of 
highly-trained persons as witnesses, and yet studies have 
demonstrated that witnesses and professional persons alike 
may be mistaken or misled in their conclusions.
Thus a question exists as to whether jurors, either 
individually or as a group, can make accurate judgments of 




The present study is an investigation of the in­
fluence of prestige suggestion on the determination of 
sanity in jury proceedings.
Temerlin and Trousdale (I966) demonstrated that 
prestige suggestion is a highly influential factor in per­
sonality diagnoses made by psychiatrists and psychologists, 
but they did not study the diagnoses of laymen. Although 
it has not been demonstrated empirically, it seems reason­
able that the influence of prestige suggestion might be 
even greater when non-professional persons determine issues 
of mental illness. In sanity hearings juries of laymen 
decide the mental condition of the defendant. These jurors 
may rely on expert testimony in formulating their opinions, 
but the jury, not the expert, makes the decision.
The law precludes study of actual jury proceedings 
within the context of a trial. However, selection of 
jurors and other trial procedures are well-defined and re­
latively circumscribed; thus, jury functioning lends itself 
to being studied by means of simulated juries.
In many ways, a jury resembles any small group
18
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which is assembled with a specified purpose or goal. Ex­
perimental studies of small group functioning have revealed 
aspects of behavior which are consistent and predictable in 
such situations and which can be expected to occur within 
the jury situation also. These studies suggest certain 
hypotheses which are pertinent to the purposes of this study 
as it relates to the influences of various factors on jury 
functioning. The determination of mental condition by lay­
men assembled as a jury entails both a situation and con­
cepts which are unfamiliar and ambiguous and subject to the 
dynamics of small groups mentioned earlier. Therefore, it 
was predicted: (1 ) that the individual juror will be influ­
enced in his decision regarding the mental condition of the 
defendant so as to be consistent with the prestige sugges­
tion which he receives, and (2 ) in the absence of prestige 
suggestion the jurors will be able to accurately identify 
behavior as "sane" or "insane." It also is expected (3) 
that jurors' opinions about sanity or insanity will be less 
accurate when they are given conflicting prestige sugges­
tions than when they are given none at all. That is, their 
opinions of the mental condition of the person portrayed 
will reflect the conflict in the prestige suggestions.
Other factors which were examined are sex of the 
juror, previous jury experience, and selection and opinion 
of the jury foreman.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects. To be eligible for jury duty in the 
State of Oklahoma, the prospective juror must be a pro­
perty owner and a taxpayer. Names of prospective jurors 
are obtained from current Homestead Exemption files, and, 
in the case of married couples, the names of husband and 
wife are recorded independently. Names of prospective 
jurors are placed in a "jury wheel" and drawn at random 
by the County Clerk in the presence of the judge in whose 
court they are to serve. The prospective juror cannot be 
a known felon, an alcoholic, or a mental patient. In addi­
tion, attorneys, medical doctors, other professional per­
sons, and housewives with minor children may be excused 
from jury duty.
Current jury lists were screened and only subjects 
who met the criteria for jury duty established by the State 
of Oklahoma were contacted for participation in this study. 
In addition, persons who were not listed in the telephone 
directories of Cleveland County or who were known to the 
experimenter were eliminated. Elimination of those persons
20
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not possessing a telephone may have introduced a bias in 
subject selection which is not present in typical jury 
selection. However, this was necessary as subjects had to 
be contacted in person and legally could not be subpoenaed 
to serve.
Subjects were first contacted by letter from a 
local attorney (Appendix A) and asked to participate in a 
study of legal procedures. Terms were avoided which might 
imply that a study of a psychological nature was being con­
ducted. The letter was followed by a telephone call in 
which their cooperation was confirmed and the time of the 
study established. Two hundred thirty prospective subjects 
were contacted and 101 (44%) of these persons participated.
All subjects who were contacted by letter were 
used as a subject pool. Names were drawn from this pool 
at random and subjects contacted by telephone until 8 
groups of 12 jurors each were filled. In addition, four 
alternates were contacted for each group. If one of the 
regular "jurors" did not appear at the appointed time, he 
was replaced by one of the alternates. If an alternate did 
not replace a juror he participated in the experiment inso­
far as hearing the evidence and casting ballots. However, 
he was asked not to participate in the discussion. Data 
obtained from these alternates were not included in any 
analyses which were made. Every effort was made to have 
experimental sessions at such times that persons could
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attend regardless of occupation. The number of male and 
female jurors in each group and the number having previous 
jury service are shown in Table 1.
Materials. Two scripts were prepared, one portray­
ing a mentally healthy and effective man, the other a psy­
chotic man. A professional actor was engaged to depict 
each role in taped interviews with a clinical psychologist 
(Appendix B). Each tape employed the same actor, the same 
interviewer, and approximately the same questions: the
interviews were the same length. The tape portraying the 
normal man was the same as used in the Temerlin and Trous­
dale (1966) experiments in which the criteria for mental 
health included psychosexual maturity, ability to establish 
a warm interpersonal relationship, self-confidence, and 
logical, coherent verbalization.
The criteria used in preparing the tape portraying 
a psychotic man included identification with the parent of 
the opposite sex, inability to establish warm interpersonal 
relationships, unrealistic self-confidence, illogical and 
disorganized communication, and "paranoid" or hypersuspi- 
cious verbalizations. Before the tape was prepared, the 
actor was instructed that he was to portray a psychotic 
man who was evasive, suspicious, defensive, and irrational 
on certain topics frequently found to be foci of paranoid 
thought processes, such as communism.
Three clinical psychologists with extensive
23
Table 1
Distribution by Groups of Sex and 
Previous Jury Service of Subjects
Subjects with 
Previous Jury
Group Males Females Servii
I 4 8 7
II 6 6 7
III 9 3 5
IV 9 3 6
V 9 3 8
VI 7 5 6
VII 8 4 8
VIII 10 2 _Z
TOTAL N 62 34 54
24
experience in diagnosis and treatment evaluated the second 
tape and agreement was unanimous that the portrayal effec­
tively depicted a psychotic individual. The "normal" man 
was considered to be normal on the basis of control group 
data reported by Temerlin and Trousdale (I966).
Legal instructions were prepared which were pat­
terned after instructions of a judge in an actual sanity 
hearing before a jury. They are presented in Appendix C.
Experimental Design. The experimental design is 
presented in Table 2. The independent variables are the 
2 tapes portraying a psychotic and a normal man, and the 
four conditions of prestige suggestion. The dependent 
variable is the individual ballots (i.e., sane; insane) 
of each subject, obtained before and after group discus­
sion .
Insofar as subjects' votes of "sane" or "insane" 
correspond to the mental condition depicted the votes will 
be referred to as "accurate." However, it is recognized 
that accuracy per se is not being measured as this could 
be interpreted as encompassing the identification of role 
playing by an actor.
Procedure. Subjects were assembled in the jury 
room of the Cleveland County Courthouse. They first were 
given the prestige suggestion and the appropriate tape was 
played. Subjects then were given the jury instructions 




TAPE : INSANE 
Ballot 1 Ballot 2
TAPE:SANE 
Ballot 1 Ballot 2
Group Group
C Insane I II« 0
bO-H
■H Sane III IV
-p m0] «
d) bC Conflicting V VI
U bCO. 2
to None Given VII VIII
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not to discuss the tape until after the first ballot.
After the first ballots were cast and collected, 
each person was asked to identify himself by name and oc­
cupation, and the group selected a foreman. Subjects then 
were instructed to attempt to arrive at a unanimous deci­
sion regarding the mental condition of the person portrayed 
and a fifteen minute uninterrupted discussion followed and 
was recorded.
Following the discussion second ballots were cast 
and collected, and subjects were asked to complete a ques­
tionnaire (Appendix D). When they finished they were 
thanked for their cooperation but no explanation of the 
actual purpose of the experiment was given. Subjects were 
asked not to discuss the experiment in order to protect the 
naivete of future subjects.
Four conditions of prestige suggestion were tested. 
Each prestige suggestion was given to two groups; that is, 
it was given both to a group hearing the tape portraying 
the psychotic man and to a group hearing the tape portray­
ing the normal man. Thus there were eight groups of sub­
jects in all. The four conditions of prestige suggestion 
are as follows:
Condition 2» Two psychiatrists have agreed in
their diagnoses that the man being 
interviewed is insane.
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Condition II. Two psychiatrists have agreed in
their diagnoses that the man being 
interviewed is sane.
Condition III. Two psychiatrists have disagreed
in their diagnoses of the man be­
ing interviewed. One psychiatrist 
diagnosed him as "insane" the 
other as "sane."
Condition IV. No prestige suggestion was given.
Steps were taken to prevent those demand character­
istics which can be expected to accompany a psychological 
experiment from influencing the results of this experiment. 
The focus was on legal procedures with no reference to the 
psychological nature of the study, and the experiment was 
conducted in the jury room of the Cleveland County Court­
house. Finally, in order to assess the demand character­
istics of this situation, a questionnaire was administered 
after all other data had been obtained. This questionnaire 
included items pertaining to subject characteristics, pre­
vious jury experience of each subject, and his opinion re­
garding the experimental situation as compared with actual 
jury duty with which he had experience.
Each group was tested separately, and ballots and 
questionnaires were numbered in order to identify those 
from each juror. This permitted assessment of any change 
of opinion which occurred with group discussion.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Regarding the hypothesized relationship between
prestige suggestion and jury decision, only votes cast on
the first ballots are relevant because only the first
ballots are free of the influence of group discussion.
Raw data are included in Appendix E, and a summary
of the data is presented in Table 3-
Hypothesis The first hypothesis predicted that
judgments of sanity and insanity would be influenced in
the direction of prestige suggestion (Conditions 1 & II).
The relevant data are presented in Table 4. Significant
differences were found between votes of "sane" and "insane"
2under the two conditions (X = 6.9, p<.Ol); therefore, 
hypothesis 1 is supported. These data demonstrate that 
when the jury heard a tape of a "sane" man they tended to 
judge him as either sane or insane depending on the pres­
tige suggestion they were given. Conversely, when the 
jury heard a type of an "insane" man they again tended to 




Votes on Ballot 1 and Ballot 2 Under All Conditions
Tape: Insane Tape : Sane
Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 1 Ballot 2
Insane InsaneSane Insane Sane Sane InsaneSane
Insane : II
faO-H •H +> Sane : II 12
Conflicting : 11 1012 11




Votes on Ballot 1 Under Conditions I and II
Ballot 1
Vote: Sane Vote: Insane
bO-H 
■H +> Sane :
l410Insane :
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Hypothesis It was hypothesized that in the ab­
sence of prestige suggestion (Condition IV) jurors would 
be able to identify the mental condition of the persons 
accurately. Hypothesis 2 is not supported; although all 
subjects under Condition IV judged the normal man "sane", 
voting was less consistent when the psychotic man was be­
ing judged. In this instance, only 5 of the 12 jurors 
judged him "insane." Data relevant to hypothesis 2 are 
included in Table 3 «
Hypo thesis It was further hypothesized that
jurors' opinions about sanity or insanity would be less 
accurate when they are given conflicting information than 
when they are given no prestige suggestion. Data pertain­
ing to this hypothesis are presented in Table 5» Analysis 
of these data demonstrated that accuracy of judgment under 
the two conditions did not differ (X^ = 3 *08 , p > . 05)«
Under Conditions 111 and IV the normal man was judged "sane" 
on 22 of the 24 ballots cast; however, only 6 of the 24 
ballots cast by subjects hearing the psychotic man were 
"insane." Thus, hypothesis 3 is rejected.
Tendency to vote sane. As noted above, of the 48 
subjects in Conditions 111 and IV, 22 judged the normal man 
"sane" and l8 judged the psychotic man "sane" on the first 
ballot. Such a finding raises a question as to whether 
there was a general tendency among subjects to vote "sane" 
which held over all conditions of the study. Examination
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Table 5
The Effects of Conflicting and Absent 
Prestige Suggestions on Ballot 1
Ballot 1
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of this question demonstrated that when all conditions are
considered, subjects voted "sane" on 68 of the 96 first
ballots cast. The frequency of votes of "sane" (Table 6)
was found to be significantly greater than the frequency
of votes of "insane" (Mann-Whitney U Test, p <C.05).
Nonetheless, the tendency to "vote sane" was not
overriding for, without prestige suggestion, (Table 7),
the psychotic man was judged "sane" less frequently than
2was the normal man (X = 6.1, p <.02).
Ballot Subjects were instructed to attempt to
reach agreement during group discussion following the first 
ballot. It was found that some changes in judgment from 
vote 1 to vote 2 were observed in every group except one 
(Group VIII) in which unanimity had been obtained on vote 
1. In three other groups (Groups IV, V, & VI) agreement 
approached unanimity on the first vote (see Table 3)- A 
low absolute number of changes from vote 1 to vote 2 was 
found and was not statistically significant. However, in 
every group the direction of change was toward the majority 
opinion or toward the prestige suggestions when they were 
not conflicting (pertinent data are in Table 3)«
Subject variables. Certain subject variables (sex 
of jurors, previous jury duty of subjects, and opinion of 
jury foreman) were investigated as possible influential 
factors in a jury's formulation of an opinion.
Sex of jurors was not found to be a significant
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Table 6
The Effects of Prestige Suggestion on 
Judgments of Sanity and Insanity
Ballot 1
Vote:Sane Vote:InsaneAo•H IInsane: 10 14
tn0)
hC
S Sane: l8 6
V)
0)
•H Conflicting: 21 3-w
IQ
4)
None given: 19 5
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Table 7
The Effects of Tape on Judgments 
of Sanity and Insanity
Ballot 1
Vote:Sane Vote:Insane
o Sane : 40 8
a«H Insane: 28 20
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factor in voting; male and female jurors did not differ in
the frequency with which they judged the persons portrayed
2on the tapes to be sane or insane (X = 3.70, p>-05) 
(Table 8).
Previous jury duty was not found to be a signifi­
cant factor in making judgments; opinions as to the sanity 
or insanity of the persons portrayed on the two tapes did 
not differ as a function of previous jury duty (X =
.11, p > . 70). Data pertaining to this analysis are pre­
sented in Table 9-
The opinion of the jury foreman has previously 
been demonstrated to be a significant factor in jury de­
liberations (Strodtbeck, et al., 1937). However, in most 
groups (6 of 8) the vote of the foreman did not differ 
from the vote of the majority on ballot 1 and the relative 
influence of these two factors could not be weighed. De­
spite this fact, the trends of voting in the groups are 
informative and merit examination.
Group ^  (Tape: Insane; Prestige Suggestion: In­
sane). The foreman and one of the two jurors who voted 
"sane" on ballot 1, contrary both to the majority and the 
prestige suggestion, subsequently changed their votes to 
"insane" on ballot 2.
Group II (Tape: Sane; Suggestion: Insane). The
foreman voted with the prestige suggestion and contrary to 
the majority on ballot 1. He did not change his vote on
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Table 8
Votes on Ballot 1 and Sex of Jurors
Ballot 1
Vote:Sane Vote:Insane 
Male : 48 l4
F emale: 20 14
38
Table 9




g ̂  Yes: 39 15
•H Q 
>
& 2 No: 29 13
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the second ballot, but two jurors changed their votes to 
"insane" on ballot 2 in accord with the foreman's opinion; 
however, one juror changed his vote in the opposite direc­
tion; i.e., from "insane" on the first ballot to "sane" on 
the second ballot.
Group III (Tape: Insane; Suggestion: Sane). The
foreman voted "sane" on ballot 1 as did the majority of 
jurors; however, the foreman changed his opinion during the 
discussion and voted "insane" on ballot 2. No other juror 
made this change, but two jurors changed their votes in 
the opposite direction; i.e., from "insane" on ballot 1 to 
"sane" on ballot 2 in accord with the majority.
Group IV (Tape: Sane; Suggestion: Sane). The
foreman voted "sane" with the majority on both ballots.
One juror changed his vote to "sane" in accord with the 
opinion of the majority.
Groups V and VI (Each tape with conflicting sug­
gestions). When conflicting prestige suggestions were given 
the foremen voted "sane", as did the majority of the jurors. 
In neither group did the foreman change his vote on ballot 
2 ; however, in each group one juror changed his vote on 
ballot 2 to "sane", a vote which then was in accord with 
those of the majority, including the foreman.
Groups VII and VIII (Each tape with no prestige 
suggestion). The majority of jurors in each of these groups, 
including the foremen, voted "sane" on both ballots. It is
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possible that the opinion of the foreman had an effect on 
the judgments of other jurors in Group VII (Tape: Insane),
because four votes were changed from ’’insane" to "sane" in 
the direction of the vote of the majority, including the 
foreman. A second interpretation, that these shifts occurred 
because of group discussion rather than solely because of the 
foreman's opinion, is equally probable.
In Group VIII, unanimity was found on both ballot I 
and ballot 2 .
Group Discussions. Each discussion was recorded 
and the following comments were selected as representative 
of each condition. These comments are presented as sugges­
tive and interesting, but they are not conclusive. No 
quantitative comparisons are possible from group to group 
because of the inaudibility of portions of several of the 
recordings. Discussions of the "insane" tape under the 
four conditions of prestige suggestion are presented first, 
followed by discussions of the "sane" tape under the four 
conditions.
Condition When both the tape and the suggestion
were "insane", jurors' comments appeared to be more judg­
mental, intolerant, and opinionated.
This man's definitely sick, I'm of the definite 
opinion he needs psychiatric care.
You can't take chances.
I'm a religious woman and anyone who says 'God is 
dead' is crazy.
4l
He spoke about the gun, there is too much of that, 
that needs to be stopped. . . .1 think he should be
committed.
Condition II. When the tape was "insane" and the 
suggestion "sane", maximizing cognitive dissonance, jurors' 
comments seemed to reflect more tolerance for the behavior 
of the person and less dogmatism. Under this condition 
questions about type of care were raised.
No doubt h e ’s got a problem. . . .
He sounds like a screwball. You can't say all the
people who walk around talking like that are insane.
No doubt that he's mentally ill. . . .question is
the extent of mental illness.
Was he to be put into an institution or be an out­
patient ?
What is care? Out-patient or commitment?
Insecurity involved here. Voluntarily or involun­
tarily they've got to have help. But it doesn't involve 
insanity.
Condition III. When the tape was "insane" and the 
suggestions conflicting, the jurors seemed to become more 
deeply involved in the discussion. There were more comments 
which reflected a need for structure and evidence than in 
other groups. The question "What is insanity?" was raised 
more frequently. These comments are typical:
. . .1 would need a lot more evidence to say he's
insane.
An intelligent jury can't pass judgment because you 
don't know what the signs are -- what are the boundaries 
of sanity and insanity? You have to have rules to go 
b y . . .  .
42
We can't make a decision. . . .
No evidence that he mishandled his business or his 
family either.
It would take a lot more evidence one way or the 
o ther.
Condition IV. When the tape was "insane" and no 
prestige suggestion was given, the jurors appeared more 
frustrated during the discussion. They often talked at 
once, and frequently argued with each other, an event which 
did not occur during any other discussion. The comments of 
these jurors reflect attention to the experience of the per­
son portrayed, and questions were raised regarding the mean­
ing of commitment.
He kept evading the questions about himself, he 
wouldn't talk about himself, he didn't seem to keep a 
train of thought, he kept jumping from one thing to 
ano ther.
He thinks his neighbors are communists, he thinks 
they're out to get him.
. . .(there was) conflict in his family which
twisted his personality but he loved his mother and 
father and loved his own family.
How do you determine who should be committed or
not ?
We all agree the person needs help.
Committing somebody is a pretty serious business.
Discussions of the "sane" tape under the four con­
ditions of prestige suggestion:
Condition I. Tape: "sane"; Suggestion: "insane".
He, himself, went to a psychiatrist and said, "I 
don't know if I need your help or not."
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As far as his attitude, I feel every person is as 
entitled to feel this way as the next person. A lot 
of people don't believe in a life hereafter -- and as 
far as that feeling -- he might have been a little im­
mature -- not any different from a lot of people.
People are getting more accustomed to our mental 
hospitals and it's not such a disgrace any more, people 
take it as a sickness.
But to have care, if we do think he needs care we 
have to say he's insane?
You have to vote sane or insane, you have to make 
up your own mind.
My idea of insane is somebody who doesn't know 
what he's doing at all.
Condition II. Tape: "sane"; Suggestion: "sane".
I didn't think he was too different from any other 
person, I didn't think he was way out on anything. He 
had his own ideas but. . . .
He has his own ideas but we all do that. If we 
didn't, you'd have to say that pretty nearly everybody 
is insane -- because they've got different ideas. You 
run into that every day.
I might not want him as a friend -- but that doesn't 
make him insane.
If they didn't say it was a consultation with a psy­
chiatrist you'd just think it was two men talking.
Condition III. When the tape was "sane" and the 
suggestions conflicting, the comments reflected the conflict 
in the suggestions.
He's bigoted. . . .
He's confused. . . .
I would not trust my child to somebody like this,
I think he's dangerous. He definitely needs help, but 
whether you call that insanity or not I don't know.
He is neither insane or dangerous.
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What you'd refer to as abnormal sex was in his 
adolescent stage.
What was he looking for?
Condition IV. When the tape was "sane" and no sug­
gestion was given, jurors agreed unanimously that he was 
sane, and the discussion was very short. The comments of 
these jurors reflect attention to the experience of the per­
son portrayed.
Something is disturbing him, but nothing insane. . .
He's worrying about his relations with other people, 
and how he appears to other people. I don't know what 
the significance of that is.
He needs to go to work and work like the rest of us 
do. He doesn't need treatment, he needs to go to work. 
He's just as sane as he can be if he'd go to work.
He's as sane as he can be. . • .
Questionnaire data. The questionnaire administered 
at the end of each experimental session was designed to de­
termine how the experimental situation compared with previous 
jury duty of the subjects. Fifty-four of the 96 subjects 
(56%) had previously served on one or more juries. The ma­
jority of these subjects (96%) reported that both the jurors 
and the proceedings of the simulated juries did not differ 
from the actual juries with which they had experience. The 
items of the questionnaire which bean on these comparisons 
and the answers of the subjects with previous jury duty are 
presented in Table 10.
In addition to the items of the questionnaire pre­
sented in Table 10, subjects were asked to discuss the
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Table 10
Jurors' Experience with Simulated and Actual Juries
Questionnaire items Subject N
Previous jury duty? yes : 54
no : 42
Same kinds of jurors in
simulated and actual juries? yes : 52
no : 2
Comparisons of acceptance of 
responsibility by simulated 





(c) No differences: 40
(d) Other comparisons: 0
Omitted answer: 1
Comparison of impartiality of 
previous and present jurors:
(a) Previous more impartial 5
(b) Previous less impartial 3
'(c) No difference 43
Omitted answer: 3
*These answers are probably a result of ambiguity 
in the question. Nonetheless, 40 of 54 jurors felt there 
were no differences between the responsibilities expressed 
by jurors on actual and simulated juries.
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similarities and differences between their experience on 
the simulated jury and their experiences on actual juries. 
Since most subjects had responded that there were no dif­
ferences between the groups, many omitted answering this 
item on the questionnaire. However, those few who did
discuss the item commented as follows:
All jurors I think are serious and want to do the
right thing and try to make the right decision.
More freedom of discussion, more questions (in 
present study) . . .
Generally the same.
Very similar as regards the nature of participa­
tion in discussion after evidence was presented.
Just about the same type of jurors -- perhaps more 
serious on comments, etc., etc.
Much the same. . . .
Thus, the subjects' answers to the questionnaire 
and their comments indicate that they found few differences 
of any magnitude between their experiences on actual juries 
and on the simulated juries of this study. In addition, 
they reported that neither the jurors nor the discussions 
differed significantly between the two situations. Such 
findings lend support to generalizations from simulated 
juries to actual jury proceedings and functioning.
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION
The jury system has been both criticized and de­
fended on the same basis: that the juror is the "epitome
of the average man." He is the man who is chosen for his 
"lack of general ability," his absence of professional 
training and knowledge, and his layman status and inter­
ests.
Legal restrictions have severely limited investi­
gation of the jury process in any context, and, until re­
cently, subjects have been college students serving on 
simulated juries or jurors interviewed following trials.
A third method of investigation has been broad surveys of 
past jury verdicts, trends in jury decisions, and state­
ments of statistical probabilities of similar decisions 
in the future (e.g., Kalven & Zeisel, I966). The present 
study was planned specifically to replicate jury procedure 
as nearly as was feasible. Subjects reported that this 
experience, indeed, was very like their experiences as 
jurors in actual trial situations. Therefore, cautious 
generalizations about jury functioning may be permissible
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on the basis of these data.
The focus of the investigation was the influence 
of prestige suggestion (analogous to expert testimony) on 
judgments of juries, specifically on verdicts in sanity 
hearings. The purpose of utilizing the testimony of ex­
pert witnesses in legal proceedings is to assist the juror 
in his deliberations ; however, the influence of such assis­
tance has not been measured previously.
Prestige suggestion in which there was reported 
agreement between psychiatrists influenced the judgments 
of jurors, both when the suggestions were consistent with 
and contrary to the tape heard. But when jurors were 
given conflicting or no suggestions the tendency was to 
vote "sane" on both tapes.
Conflicting prestige suggestion, that is, dis­
agreement between expert witnesses, is that condition which 
most closely approximates actual trial situations. Almost 
without exception jurors are presented with conflicting 
opinions of expert witnesses and varying interpretations 
of evidence. In a sanity hearing, disagreement between 
expert witnesses could be interpreted by the juror to mean 
that the sanity of the person is "borderline" and thus en­
compasses aspects of both psychosis and normalcy. In this 
instance, with disagreement between expert witnesses, the 
jurors demonstrated an overwhelming tendency to judge both 
men sane.
49
The question of sanity is raised far more fre­
quently as a defense in criminal action than in civil 
cases. Three-fourths of the cases in which this question 
is raised are homicide cases. Kalven and Zeisel (I966) 
cite a case in which a young man, without apparent motive, 
killed his employer's pregnant wife and their three-year- 
old child. The principal defense in this instance was in­
sanity, but the jury found the defendant sane and returned 
a verdict of first degree manslaughter. Following the 
trial and sentencing, the judge voiced the opinion that 
the verdict should have been first degree murder. The 
judge observed,
The question of insanity was determined under the 
M'Naghten rule. Under that rule, I believe he was 
sane, so did the jury (Kalven & Zeisel, I966, p. 331).
The judge explained the leniency shown by the jury as an
outgrowth of the jurors' fear that conviction of murder
would carry the death penalty. He said further,
. . .the jury is sufficiently responsive to in­
sanity to save the defendant from the death penalty, 
but no more; it is willing to find him guilty and ex­
pose him to the penalties of first degree manslaughter 
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, p. 331).
Kalven and Zeisel conclude.
Thus. . .(it) is suggested. . .albeit faintly,
that the jury inclines toward a concept of reduced or 
diminished responsibility, under which insanity would 
mitigate but not exonerate (I966, p. 332).
It must be remembered that the jurors in the pre­
sent study were instructed that a civil action was being 
heard and the variable of crime was not examined. The
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data indicate that, if error is to occur, jurors prefer to 
err in the direction of moderation. For example, they were 
reluctant to return a verdict of first degree murder in the 
case cited because a question of insanity existed. In the 
present study, they apparently were reluctant to return a 
verdict of "insanity" if the question of sanity existed, 
particularly so when the question of sanity was included 
in the prestige suggestions. It is of interest to note 
that no juror in this study refused to cast a ballot, even 
though evidence was sparse. These jurors have demonstrated 
a tendency to consider wide ranges of behavior to be within 
the limits of sanity, and to hold people responsible for 
their behavior. This balancing of moderation and respon­
sibility seems to characterize the juror as the best instru­
ment which has been found for the administration of justice.
In general, verdicts obtained in the present study 
reflect the influence of the various suggestions, particu­
larly when the suggestions were not conflicting with each 
other or with the stimulus material. But the discussions 
themselves differed. This was an unexpected finding and 
is only suggestive of a trend rather than conclusive; how­
ever, it merits examination in some detail.
The groups which were given a prestige suggestion 
in accord with the stimulus stated their opinions without 
equivocation. The data indicate that the influence of ex­
pert testimony is greatest when it is not in conflict with
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the juror's reported perception of the person being judged 
(Table 3)- Under such circumstances, testimony appears to 
be interpreted by the juror as confirming his opinion 
rather than influencing it. That is, when subjects were 
presented with the "sane" tape and told psychiatrists agreed 
in their diagnoses of sanity, and conversely, when subjects 
were presented with the "insane" tape and told psychiatrists 
agreed in their diagnoses of insanity, the content of the 
discussions tended to be in accord with the diagnoses and 
the tape. However, jurors presented their opinions as if 
they were original and therefore independent of the expert 
opinion they had heard. It was observed that no juror re­
ferred to the expert opinion during discussion.
In sharp contrast, confusion and uncertainty char­
acterized the comments made by jurors who heard a prestige 
suggestion in direct opposition to the mental condition of 
the person portrayed. Under these circumstances, accuracy 
of judgment decreased and the discussions emphasized spe­
cific characteristics of the person. His remarks often 
were quoted, apparently in an effort to justify and confirm 
whatever vote the juror had cast. Questions were raised 
during the discussions regarding the meaning of "care", 
"commitment", and "sanity", and, in each instance, discus­
sion seemed to center on specific behavior of the person 
in question.
Under the condition of disagreement between experts,
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the opinions voiced by individual jurors centered around 
the sparsity of evidence. Comments of the jurors appeared 
to reflect an uncertainty of judgment, and, almost without 
exception, jurors expressed a need for more evidence in 
order to reach a decision. It is of particular interest 
to note that, under these circumstances, more jurors were 
reluctant to judge either man insane than when they re­
ceived no suggestion at all. As illustrated in Table 3» 
when no suggestion was given, the psychotic man was judged 
"insane” on vote 1 by five jurors; however, only one juror 
judged him "insane" when conflicting suggestions were given.
Under the condition in which no expert testimony 
was reported, the nature of discussion again shifted. This 
time the questions tended to center on the disposal of the 
case: that is, whether the person would be committed if
found insane. This was the only condition in which there 
seemed to be a consistent attempt to understand the inter­
nal experiences of both men. Such attempts suggest that, 
when left to their own devices and not told what to think, 
jurors attend to the most meaningful level of diagnosis-- 
that of internal experience. This, of course, may be true 
only in the absence of the defendant, because if he were 
present, jurors undoubtedly would receive many cues from 
his appearance, manner, social status, and similar relevant 
variables .
The results indicate that jurors take cognizance of
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expert testimony and opinion to the extent that their 
judgments shift under varying testimony. However, their 
own biases and opinions enter into their decisions also 
and influence the judgments which are made. In general, 
if a reasonable doubt exists, they tend to demonstrate 
both a tolerance for the behavior of the person in ques­
tion and concern for the sentence which is contingent upon 
their verdict. This is not to imply, however, that aber­
rant behavior is summarily excused, because it was found 
that the psychotic man was judged "sane" significantly 
less often than was the normal man (Table 7). Thus it is 
suggested that jurors evince a concern and a duty both to 
the safeguarding of the individual's rights and to the 
protection of society in general. Certainly such caution 
is both a demand of the law and its greatest commitment.
Implications for Future Research 
The tradition of justice is inherent in the con­
cept of trial by jury. The fact that this concept occu­
pies a central position in the workings of a democratic 
society leads some persons to the opinion that it is 
sacrosanct and above question or investigation. Conversely, 
others are of the opinion that the jury system is a cumber­
some and uncontrollable process which should be abandoned. 
The disparity between such extreme points of view can be 
resolved only by investigation of jury procedure from the 
viewpoints of scientific and legal knowledge.
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Further study should be given to the effect of de­
fendant variables on jury decision. For example, bias of 
judgment undoubtedly is introduced by the race and reli­
gious views of the person being tried, his physical appear­
ance, sex, and socio-economic status. If a crime is in­
volved, the type of crime would appear to exert a consider­
able influence on the decisions of jurors, particularly if 
the crime were sexual in nature, involving a child or sev­
eral victims, or was unusually cold-blooded or bizarre.
One subject in the present study wrote on his questionnaire 
that his previous jury duty involved a case of indecent ex­
posure. He added a note which said:
Previous jury became more emotional as time pro­
gressed. They were finally more concerned with pun­
ishment than with guilt or innocence.
Extensive research should be devoted to understand­
ing the relative effects of varying amounts of evidence.
It has been said (Hoffman & Brodley, 1952) that recall de­
creases as amount of evidence increases, but this effect 
has not been examined systematically.
Finally, the concepts of mental health and mental 
illness need to be clarified. Many jurors raised questions 
regarding sanity and insanity, their boundaries, and their 
behavioral manifestations. The distance between psychia­
tric and legal perspectives in the area of mental function­
ing and legal responsibility is great. Further research, 
consisting of cooperative efforts between psychiatry and 
law, is needed to clarify these issues.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
This study was designed to evaluate the influence 
of prestige suggestion on judgments of sanity by simulated 
juries. Four "juries" heard a tape portraying a man who 
met both theoretical and empirical criteria of "normalcy"; 
four other "juries" heard a tape portraying a man who was 
judged psychotic by a panel of clinical psychologists.
Four conditions of prestige suggestion were studied. Two 
votes, one before and one following group discussion, were 
obtained from each juror.
It was hypothesized that jurors' judgments would 
be influenced in the direction of a definite prestige sug­
gestion; that conflicting suggestions would decrease accu­
racy of judgment; and, that, in general, accuracy would be 
obtained when no prestige suggestion was given.
It was found that judgments tended to be in accord 
with definite suggestions. The influence of definite pres­
tige opinion is greatest when it is in agreement with the 
reported experience of the subjects and not contrary to 
the stimulus material. However, when conflicting suggestions 
were given, accuracy of judgment decreased and judgments
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were in the direction of "sane". When no suggestion was 
given, judgments of "sane" reached 100 per cent when the 
tape of the sane man was presented. However, only five of 
the 12 jurors judged the insane man to be "insane" when no 
suggestion was given. Agreement did not increase signifi­
cantly after discussion: this was due largely to the fact
that, in several juries, consensus was high on ballot 1.
An unexpected observation was that the discussions 
tended to differ one from another under the different con­
ditions. This tendency merits further systematic examina­
tion .
A heartening finding insofar as the jury system, 
in general, is concerned was the tolerance for wide ranges 
of behavior as sane, an attitude which was demonstrated by 
jurors over all conditions.
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G. DAN RAMBO 
Attorney at Law 
118 North Peters 
Phone JE 6-1333 
Norman, Oklahoma
You are aware of the current focus of attention on 
the court system in Oklahoma and on the administration of 
Justice generally. An evaluation is being sought of the 
legal system at work and as an attorney I have been asked 
to assist in this study. Cleveland county has been chosen 
as one of the sites of study.
Because you are a resident of this county who is 
eligible for jury duty you are urged to aid in this evalu­
ation by giving, in the near future, not more than two 
hours of your time. This time will be spent at the Cleve­
land County Courthouse sitting as a mock jury. Every effort 
will be expended to set a time and date which will be agree­
able to you and the other participants.
You will be contacted by telephone so that we can 
answer any questions you may have and to establish a date 
and time which will be convenient for you.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
/Sincerely y  durs ,





Transcript of Interview With Normal, Healthy Man
I = interviewer 
C = "client”
I 1: My name is Dr. Temerlin. What can I do for you?
C 1: Well, I don't really know. I don't think there's
anything wrong with me. I, I've read a lot about 
psychotherapy--oh, not a lot but I, I've read some 
about psychotherapy and it may be that psychotherapy 
can help me so--I, I really came in here to, to talk 
that over with you I guess.
I 2: Well, where does it hurt? What makes you think you
need psychotherapy?
C 2; I'm not really sure I do need it. I'm not crazy
you know, I know what other people are saying and 
doing. I don't hear voices. I'm not a homosexual 
--nobody's calling me a homosexual and I'm not a 
Communist. (Laughter.)
I 3 : (Laughter.) Well, what makes you think you need
treatment then?
C 3 : Well, I'm not really sure I do but you, you know,
as far as I know. I, I've only got one life to live
and it may be that psychotherapy could help me get
more out of life. I, I want to live life to the 
fullest and experience as much as I can. I want to
have as good a time as I can. I was raised a Chris­
tian but I'm not really a Christian. I don't be­
lieve in life after death and a Supreme Being any 
more. I think that I should just get as much out 
of this life as I can. Actually, I'm getting quite 
a bit out of it, I think. I enjoy my work and I 
think I'm very good at it.
I 4 : What is your work? What do you do?
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C 4: I'm a graduate student. I'm in mathematics. I've
always been good at math or any kind of physical 
science. I, I enjoy it. I can get off into math 
and, you know, it's just a, a world of its own.
It's got its own symmetry and its own beauty, its 
own orderly procedures and processes and I'm quite 
happy with it. I don't mean to imply by this now 
that I don't get along with people too. I, I get 
along very well with people--don't really have any 
trouble with them. I, I suppose I'm somewhat atyp­
ical as a math major. I was raised on a farm and 
I know a lot of the other graduate students over 
there come from families where their parents were 
professors or scientists of one sort or another or 
something like this.
Actually, I guess I get along real well with the 
graduate students. For that matter, with most 
people. My wife and I are, are very happy to­
gether. We, we do quarrel sometimes though.
I 5 ’- What do you quarrel about?
C 3 : Well, we quarrel--I wouldn't say a lot but we fight
sometimes. I suspect everybody fights sometimes.
A lot of times I have doubts about whether or not 
we're raising our son right. We've been married 
about eight, I guess about seve years and have a 
child five, a boy and, and a lot of little things 
you know come up in the process of raising a child. 
I'm sure you know about this better than I do.
Well, you want to do one thing--your wife wants to 
do another. You really don't know what's best for 
the child. We're raising him as well, as good as
we can--not like I was raised or not like my wife
was raised.
I 6: You're trying to do as well by him as you can.
C 6; Yeah. We're as modern and progressive as we can.
We've read Spock, and we love our child. We give 
him the best of medical care and all that but, oh,
I don't know, sometimes when I come home I'm all 
preoccupied with studying for general exams or some 
aspect of mathematics I'm probably not, I probably 
don't pay as much attj "on as I ought to, but you 
can't really say there's anything the matter with 
that. Aren't most people that way?
I 7: Are they?
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c 7 : Well, my wife, she loves him. We, we don't punish
him at all. Sometimes, well, my wife doesn't pun­
ish him either. She found him masturbating the 
other day and she didn't say anything about it, you 
know. He was just sitting on the couch in the liv­
ing room playing with himself and she told him,
she told him that he shouldn't do that, but she
didn't punish him or anything like that. She pro­
bably figures, well, he didn't know what he was do­
ing. He's really too young to know anything about 
sex and so on, so she told him that this was private, 
you know, and he ought to do it in the bathroom but 
not in the living room— particularly when there's 
anybody about, you know. But, I, I thought she did 
all right on that. She didn't tell him she was go­
ing to cut it off or anything like my mother would 
have. We do quarrel though over raising the child 
about one thing though.
I 8: What's that?
C 8: Well, my wife goes to the Episcopal Church and she
wants to take him. You know, I was raised in the
Church of Christ--you know what that's like— and I 
had religion crammed into me when I was very, very 
young. Now, I don't want to force my child to go 
to the Episcopal, or go to any church. He's only 
5^ or 6, I think that's too early really to start
a kid in Sunday School or church. He, he's not old
enough to make up his own mind. I, I'm a scientist
myself and I think you should never indoctrinate a
child in religious dogma until he's old enough to 
examine the evidence for himself. Well, anyway, 
she wants to take him to church with her and I don't 
care whether she goes to church or not--she can be­
lieve anything she damn well wants to. That's her 
own business. I just, I wouldn't go myself and I 
think it's sheer hypocrisy that she wants me to go. 
I'd rather sleep late on Sunday mornings frankly, 
and I'd really rather she stay in bed with me and 
I tell her this but she's just all the time off to 
church and she wants to take him. Well, we quarrel 
about this and it's a bone of contention between us 
and we, we differ on the Viet Nam situation too.
I 9 : I know what you mean.
C 9 : Well, I'm really worried about what we're doing in
Viet Nam. It, it bothers me. I, I don't mean be­
cause I'm involved. I've got a deferment because
I'm in graduate school, in mathematics--well, I'm
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a veteran anyway. The issue is, I just don't think 
we ought to be over there in the first place and I 
sure don't think we ought to be fighting a war that 
we can't win and you know, war never solves any 
problems anyway, but my wife thinks we ought to be 
there and we ought to use more force and perhaps 
even use the A Bomb, you know and she thinks that 
I'm just a soft-headed humanitarian about this, but 
I've always been against violence in any form. As 
a matter of fact I don't even punish my child if 
there's any possible way to get around it, you know 
because I think violence is bad— it never leads to 
anything except more violence and she probably con­
siders that this is weakness.
I 10: And she probably thinks this is weakness and would
just incite them to more violence or something like 
that.
C 10: Yeah, I don't want you to think I'm crazy on the
subject of violence or anything like that. I've 
seen my share of it and I've had my share of it.
In fact, that's probably what got me interested in 
reading and studying. I, I had nothing else to do 
when I was in the Army except, ah, sit around the 
PX and read.
I 11: A little earlier, you said you were from a farm
background--that this is atypical for a math major 
and it's my experience too. Was your wife from a 
farm too?
C 11: Well, I was born on a farm and I was certainly
raised on a farm but I was always a very atypical 
person. I, I think my parents were very atypical 
people to be farmers. They were actually farmers. 
My, my father owned a large wheat farm in Iowa and 
he made his living off of it but he inherited the 
farm originally from his mother. She was the strong 
one in that family. She, she really worked it up 
into a paying operation. My father originally was 
an engineer but this was during the Depression and 
he wasn't making a very good living in engineering 
so he decided he'd better give it up. And, ah, he 
came to the farm to live there and, and be self- 
supporting. But as far as that goes, he continued 
with his reading and his engineering and he was al­
ways building things and, ah, making gimmicks on 
the farm. Well, for instance, I remember— yeah, we 
had a, we had an automatic baler before anybody, any 
people in the same county and he went out and fixed
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up an automatic milking machine. He made it him­
self, just, oh, he had all kinds of little automated 
gimmicks (laughter) and, you know, this was back in 
the days when most farms were just a matter of hard 
work and a strong back but, ah, I think our farm was 
far more modern than any of the others in the county-
I 12: To change the subject slightly here but still on the
farm--what were your parents like back on the farm?
C 12: Well, I was always a lot closer to my father than
I was to Mother. You know, I liked to, like all 
kids I guess, I liked to go out on the tractor with 
him and when he wasn't farming he was always taking 
me hunting or fishing. I remember we used to go 
pheasant hunting; when I was just 6 or 7 he got me 
a .22, my first rifle, then a couple of years later 
I got a shotgun. But, I suppose he was as good a 
dad as anybody could ask for. I, I know when he 
died, when he died about 4 years ago— I was really 
shook up. I remember I was very depressed over that, 
very unhappy. Ah, I'd been closer to him than anyone 
I guess. I really loved him and I remember for sev­
eral weeks there I couldn't, couldn't work or sleep 
or do anything--couldn't even read very well at all. 
I, I was really shook up. I, I stayed at home for a 
while, helped my mother with the farm and eventually 
she, she got herself some people you know, to live 
with her and she's she's still living on the farm.
You know, she doesn't really do that much of the work 
herself but keeps books I think.
I 13: Y0U--I may be putting words in your mouth, but if so
you can spit them out, but you seem to feel much dif­
ferently about her than you did your father.
C 13 : Well, I, I guess I was always closer to my father
than I was to my mother. She, she's all right in
her w a y . I , I think she loved m e . I think— we had 
a big family, you know, I had three brothers and two 
sisters. It, it was a big family. She was always 
taking care of them and I, I always kinda felt that 
she, I thought she picked at my father a little bit. 
Oh, she'd always want him to wash up before dinner.
He didn't think of anything like that. He'd come 
in from the field and he'd have dirt on his hands 
and sit right down and she'd say, "Now, Daddy, you're 
setting a bad example." She, she always called him 
"Daddy." She'd say, "You're setting a bad example 
for the children--go on in the bathroom and wash 
your hands," just like make him go in the other room
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and wash his hands. You know, I always felt about 
it--I was a kid, I felt about it, you know, hell, 
my hands are going to get dirty again anyway.
I l4: Well, she did seem a lot different. She was a
different kind of person than he was.
C l4: Well, I mean, well, my dad, even though he was a
farmer, you know--he always, well he liked to talk
science and show me things like how to fix cars 
and those things, ah, on the farm. We were always 
tinkering with things. I could always talk to him, 
you know but I, I couldn't with her so very well. 
She, she seemed to be mostly interested in taking 
care of the kids, cooking and baking and (laughter) 
going to country socials--she, you've heard this 
about mother, she always had to enter her jams or 
her relish in some kind of contest or was always 
making a cake for the fair.
I 15*' (Laughter.)
C 15: Well, I wanted to sit around and read or talk to
my dad or, or go hunting or fishing or, I wasn't 
really interested. And besides, Mother was kind 
of nuts— well, maybe I shouldn't say she was nuts, 
but she was at least she was pretty fanatical.
I 16: I'll bet I can guess on what subject--sex or reli­
gion or both?
C 16; Both, a combination. She was pretty fanatic, you 
know she was always taking me to Sunday School— I 
had this religion forced down me and telling me 
about my "private parts" and how these were "pri­
vate" and she would always say, "You know the Lord 
gave us these to reproduce our own kind, but for 
heaven's sakes, don't touch them," and didn't want 
us to have any dirty thoughts. I, I remember the
first time she, ah, she found me playing with my 
sex, playing with myself, ah, it was really some­
thing. I really didn't, I didn't know a thing 
about sex or what it was or anything. I, I remem­
ber one day, I came out, just as I was leaving the 
bathroom, I felt this funny sensation--it was actu­
ally kind of good, you know, it was kind of funny-- 
I don't remember now exactly how it felt but so 
without thinking about it I was just rubbing myself 
as I came out of the bathroom instead of putting 
my penis back in my pants and Mother saw this and 




C 17 : She got this real funny expression on her face and
said, "What are you doing?" you know. Well, I, 
hell, I didn't even know what to tell her. It was 
so new, but I, I got the idea all right that I 
should never do anything like that. And she told 
me that she never wanted to see me touching my 
"privates" again. I remember, I was scared. I, I 
really didn't know what I was doing wrong but. I,
I knew from her expression or something. I'd really 
done something wrong. I was real scared for, for 
a long time there.
I 18: What happened?
C 18: I don't know what happened* Nothing happened, I
guess. I, probably, I probably just forgot about 
sex for a while. I, I don't think I ever had much 
to do with it probably then or maybe until I was 
pretty far along in high school or junior high or 
something like that. When I started, actually 
started, you know, started having dates and going 
with girls I was still scared. You know, I really 
was. I got so, well, there was this one girl I 
remember in junior high school. I thought she was, 
boy, she was the sweetest, prettiest thing I ever 
saw. She was just too much and I remember I got 
real interested in her and I really liked her and 
I was so scared even to ask her over to my house 
or take her on a date or something. Well, she was 
the first one I had a date with I guess. I didn't
ask her for a long time, you know because I was
afraid. I just knew she'd say no. Well, finally 
I, well, I finally just screwed up my courage I 
guess and I, I took her out, I took her for a date 
and we went together--I guess we went steady, I 
guess you'd call it in those days, for a long time 
and that was, really that was my first experience 
with sex. I remember, I was very nervous and I
was really anxious about it. She was too and, oh,
I don't remember now but we were probably too 
scared--so scared we couldn't really enjoy it.
I 19 : Do you--I wonder if you still feel that way.
C 19 : What way?
I 20: So anxious about sex that you can't enjoy it.
C 20: Oh, no, no. This was just in junior high school.
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She and I started, just started having intercourse 
in junior high school. I was pretty anxious for a 
while. Oh, but it gradually got to where it was 
much more fun and she and I went together for two 
or three years, ah, having intercourse all through 
junior high school and high school. Oh, we got 
kind of worried once or twice about getting caught, 
you know, but we never did. It worked out real 
well. We, the only problem was that we could never 
get away from her family and from my family and 
school for long enough to have all we wanted. You 
know--
I 21: (Laughter.)
C 21: Well, sometimes, looking back at this now, it's
just a miracle that she didn't get pregnant because, 
well, sometimes we took precautions and sometimes 
we didn't and, ah. I've thought about it a lot and
it's just a miracle but I guess maybe we were both
so young at the time or something.
I 22: Is this your wife you're talking about?
C 22: Oh, no, no. This, this was my first real sexual
experience with a girl. You know, I used to mas­
turbate some in high school and I, I felt real
guilty about it. I didn't get married until after 
I was out of high school--matter of fact, right 
after I got out of high school, I was drafted, well, 
I was going to be drafted so I figured I might as 
well join so I spent two years in the Army.
I 23 : What--how was that? What did you do in the Army?
C 23 : (Laughter.) Nothing, by and large, really nothing.
It was a sheer waste of time on my part. I, I
didn't get a thing out of it at all. I doubt that
the military got anything out of me either. It
really, it was an unrewarding experience for both
of us I suppose. You know, I don't like anybody,
somebody always telling me what to do. I like to
live my own life and do what I want to do when I
want to do it and you just can't have that in the 
military service you know. So, well, I didn't like 
some sergeant, you know, telling me to go dig a 
ditch or shine your shoes or clean your rifle or 
something like that.
I 24: Well, let me interrupt you for a moment. I think
we're almost out of time at least for today and I 
don't think we're anywhere near finished.
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C 24: I , I don't either. You know, actually, ah, well,
I suppose this is, happens all the time but I kind 
of enjoyed talking to you. I didn't I really 
didn't think I would. When, when I came out here 
I was kinda scared--before I came out here today. 
Well, I really hated to come out here actually but 
I've kind of enjoyed it.
I 25 Well, perhaps we should talk some more. Let me
tell you the way we normally function when a per­
son comes to the Psychological Clinic. We try to 
get to know them as well as possible before we come 
to any conclusions or decisions and this usually 
involves seeing the person two or three times for 
an interview like this one and also giving him, you 
a battery of psychological tests and after this we 
would be in a position to perhaps talk more intel­
ligently with you. Would you like to arrange an 
appointment when we both have some more time, you 
and the Clinic, and we'll try and get to know you 
as well as possible and then we can see whether we 
might be of help to you.
C 25: Yeah, yeah. I'd like--if we could do that. You
know, like I say, I don't think there's anything
wrong with me but I think maybe—
I 26 : If you've got doubts or something--
C 26: This, if this can maybe help me live a full life
and get more out of life. I'd like to do that.
Transcript of Interview with Psychotic Man
I = interviewer 
C = "client”
I 1: My name is Dr. Temerlin, what can I do for you?
C 1: Well, somebody told me to come here, so I'm here.
1 mean, they said 1 ought to come. . .
1 2: Oh, tell me about it. . .
C 2: You know, help's a funny thing. How can you, how
can you even talk about helping another person. . .
but somebody told me 1 should be here, and, (sigh) 
life's been hard.
1 3 : You feel you might need some kind of help.
C 3: (laugh) Well, it's not getting any easier--what
do you want to know?
1 4: Well, you're here, apparently for some reason--why
don't you just tell me all about yourself.
C 4: I d  ■ know what you mean by that. Well, 1 was
born 1 a farm in Iowa. My parents were very good 
people and they reared a good family--are you always 
like this? Why don't you just ask me some questions? 
I'll tell you anything you want to know--just ask me 
some questions. . .
1 3 : Oh, just go ahead. Tell me more about yourself.
C 5 : They're dead (flatly).
1 6 : They?
C 6 : They're dead. You know, they were fine--they're
dead now. They were farmers--they farmed--good 
land— they raised crops. Yah, 1 remember, 1 remem­
ber when my father died, my mother carried on like
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a banshee for three weeks, she wouldn't stop cry­
ing. . .and then she never mentioned his name 
again. She was a good woman. You know, whenever 
I think about that my head starts to ache and my 
head's started to ache now. Let's talk about 
something else. . .When I think about that whole 
business of my father dying and my mother being 
a banshee I . . .(pause).
I 7 : You have strong feelings. . .
C 7 : No, NO, its over and done with! I'd rather talk
about. . .now. . .about my family. . .now. My 
family now consists of my wife and my son and my­
self. . .my wife is a tall, skinny woman. My 
son's eight. I leave most of the rearing to my 
wife in some ways. She controls the boy but I 
don't want her trying to control me. . .she's go­
ing to spoil that kid. . .she's going to spoil 
the boy.
I 8 : The boy?
C 8 : She's going to spoil him by . . .she's going to
spoil that kid. You know, he's not a bad boy I 
suppose. . .but. . .she likes to keep him weak and 
he's going to need to be strong in this world. . .
this world's a hard place and he's going to need to 
be strong. . .and she fusses over him and she worries 
about this and she worries about that. I say what 
that boy needs is more discipline.
I 9 : More discipline?
C 9 ‘ He needs to be punished, he needs to be beaten. . .
when he does something wrong. Now, I say, be kind 
to a child. . .when they're doing the right thing, 
but, if they're doing the wrong thing they need to 
learn it. And this kid's going to grow up to be a 
sissy. . .he's going to grow up to be a sissy and 
he, I mean she is going to make him into a sissy.
I can see it coming. So you know that boy is over
eight years old and he still likes a teddy bear!
But she's mighty hard to control, that woman, and 
so is he, he's getting hard to control just like 
her, he's getting just like she is.
I 10: How's that?
C 10: Now mind, I love him. But he shouldn't be like
this .
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I 11: Like this? What do you mean?
C 11: What do you mean? Well, it's hard to tolerate,
(long pause) I, I do love the boy. . .after all, 
he's my son. Now, I don't want you getting any 
wrong ideas. . .we all get along fine. You know, 
when that boy grows up he's going to go to war.
We're in war now, and in ten years he's going to 
be drafted. And he's going to be on the front 
lines, and if he's a sissy he'll get killed right 
away. You know, Viet Nam could still be going on 
ten years from now, and if he goes to Viet Nam I 
want him to be able to kill gooks with the best 
of them. Now, my wife doesn't believe in war.
You know how women are. . .Good woman! Fine woman! 
Church going woman! I don't think she's ever had 
a wicked thought. She's very active in the church.
I 12: She's the religious one in the family. . .
C 12: You know. I'm. . .I'm a mathematician. I like to
think of God as a formula. Search for the truth. .
what I'm after is truth. I taught myself math. . .
I'm a self-made man and I use it in my business. . -
I know more math than most of those professors on 
that campus. . .and I understand it, and I enjoy it.
I can get off into math and it's just a, a world of 
its own. It's got its own symmetry and its own 
beauty, its own orderly procedures and processes. . .
That's my religion.
I 13: Religion?
C 13 : "I see in a particular sense God becoming more
alive" in mathematics. "My conviction is that is
we can understand God in conjunction with the real­
ity of. . .mathematics we can then understand in a 
sense the whole tradition in which we live. . .we 
can really only move into the future by negating 
and transcending the past. Considering what we are 
facing we have no ethical principles to guide us.
And all. . .we have had, must necessarily be negated 
I have observed a number of things about the uni­
verse. It is a universe and in it is a certain mea­
sure of order more or less predictable by science."
". . .we are coming to know a whole new reality of
man, world, time, space. . .we are moving into a 
form of ions in which these old values are becoming 
reversed. Now we are coming to know a world which 
has lost all in relation to its dependency . . .on
creation. World becomes all, world becomes absolute
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We can also say this about man, history, time, 
life, energy. .
My parents believed in God, (sigh) they were good 
people. Now, mind you, they didn't believe in God 
in a truth-seeking kind of way but as a personal 
God, a personal savior, with, ah, you know, the 
long beard and all that. . .and that God is dead.
My mother prayed a lot, yah, mother prayed an 
awful lot. She always prayed for us and it made 
me feel terrible, like I had really done something 
awful. My father was. . .not there very much. . .
but my mother was always there. . .good woman. . .
she was very kind, very kind in her heart. . .she 
was always doing things for other people. . .
things she thought they needed, like she would 
take their children to Sunday school. (pause)
She was a tough old farm woman, though, and she 
didn't have too much. . .time. . .for nonsense.
And its a good thing too, you know, I would have 
grown up a sissy, like the boy's going to do. But 
you know, in her heart she was a good woman. She 
worked all the time, cleaning and washing, she said 
she could never stay ahead of the dirt. . .and she 
beat me when I needed to be beaten. She did it 
for my own good and she was right.
I l4: Could you tell me something about your father--!
didn't understand what you said about him.
C l4: My mother didn't pay much attention to my father.
Nobody paid much attention to my father. He was 
all right, he just wasn't there much--he was out 
in the fields all day and then after supper he 
would find some excuse to go to town. . .probably 
to drink beer with his cronies. You know, you'd 
have to say I didn't notice him, I didn't really 
notice him. . .she was always the important one. 
Nor, my older brother left home. . .he said he 
hated it there, he said he hated it bad.
I 15: Hated it?
C 15 : (sigh). . .1 liked my mother. She was a strong
woman and I always wanted to be strong like her.
I always said when I grew up I was going to be 
just like my mother. She never took any nonsense 
off anybody. My father was. . .(long pause), my 
father, well, my father was a calm man. He never 
got excited about anything. But you know, even 
so, he was a weak man. He was nice enough, I sup­
pose, uh, he was a good man and he meant well but,
he couldn't ever keep control of his sons or else
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that oldest son of his wouldn't have run away from 
home like he did. - .
I 16: You had a big family. . .
C 16: He ran away from home and my father didn't go after
him, no, if that had been me I would have gone after
that youngster and I would have pulled him back and 
I would have beat the hell out of him. When I left 
home the old man got teary-eyed and I swore I'd 
never go back. . .but I did. I can't stand to see
a man cry, but I went back. .to see my mother.
I went back for his funeral. . .1 went back when he
died. She was a good woman. He died and she just
carried on but she was a good woman, and she was a
strong woman. He always called her "mother." They 
never fought. . .1 never heard them argue. Some­
times, when I was a kid I used to wonder about that, 
when he would come home late and I'd hear mother
get up to let him in. . .but that's a long time
ago. . .that's water under the bridge. . .you'd 
rather hear about me, I suppose.
I 17 : Well, what about you and your wife. . .is the rela­
tionship comfortable?
C 17: I knew you'd get around to that. There are some
things I just keep private, but I'll tell you any­
thing you want to know. All you psychiatrists have
dirty minds, don't you? You always want to talk
about sex.
I 18: Sex?
C 18: Yah, you're always prying into other people's busi­
ness. You know, lots of people pry into other peo­
ple's business and they ought to keep out of it.
You know, I have some neighbors and they pry and 
they pry and they pry, and they watch. They watch 
everything I do.
I 19 : You say they watch you?
C 19: I'm not doing anything. But you know, they watch
me, and its because they think that I think they
are communists. . .and they are.
I 20: What do you make of it?
C 30: I don't care too much if they just peek out from
behind their blinds (sigh). I know what they think. 
But you know, you don't have to pay too much atten­
tion to what people think. One of these neighbors
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is pretry funny. . -he keeps talking about, about 
communists around me. Came over the other day, I 
was just mowing my lawn, Sunday morning, and 
wanted to know what I thought about communists.
I didn't tell him a thing. Communists are dirty 
rotten people.
I 21: And you've always got to be careful. . .
C 21: You've got to be careful, you've got to protect
yourself--These people are dangerous, they really 
are more dangerous than most people realize. . .
and you have every right to protect yourself. . .
you know, the police don't care what happens until 
afterwards, and even then they don't care about 
the average Joe Blow, and I keep a gun in my closet 
so that if they do anything I can protect myself. . .
now, mind you, I wouldn't use it unless I really 
had to but everyone has a right to protect himself 
from those kind of people.
I 22: Those kinds of people. . .?
C 22: You really can't trust anyone. . .you know, commu­
nists are so clever about using other people. . .
they convert some but they even use those they don't 
convert. . .like liberals, although I think more of 
them are communists than people realize. . .commu­
nism under Stalin was one thing, under Kruschev was 
another, and now it is yet another. . .its hard, in 
my opinion, and I'm no expert, its hard for the 
average man to realize how dangerous communism is, 
under any guise. Communism is the same thing as 
the French revolution when the uneducated realized 
with their power that they could kill and destroy. . ,
liberty, equality, fraternity (sarcastically). . .
1795- . .July l4. . .when mobs took over and wrecked
France. - .it was horrible. . .and because every move 
in one direction has a move in the other direction. . 
as the communist state exists today it is patterned 
on any army. . .it is part of the planned policy. . .
to undermine the government and to eventually destroy 
the government. . .that's the way they work. . .they 
have. . .and then you have a blood bath. If you 
don't conform you die or go to the salt mines. . .
they have to, to win. . .they have to rule by fear, 
oh! the well-known knock at the door. . .at two 
o'clock in the morning, they drag you out and you 
disappear, period. They have one weapon, its fear, 
and they use it. Dreadful thing! When the state 
controls you you can call it any name you want,
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socialism. . .communism, its all the same thing,
and we are going to have to control them and purge
our country of them.
I 23: Oh?
C 23: It's part of the planned policy. . .to undermine
the government and eventually destroy the govern­
ment. That's the way they work. . -They have. . .
(long pause) When the Bolshevicks took control, 
and one of them was Trotsky. . .who fled for his 
life and later was assassinated in Mexico. Koren- 
sky, Korinsky, whatever his name was. - .left. , .
had to. . .and then our government, among one or 
two others, thought we should do something about 
it and made a miserable attempt, failed, and com­
munism took over and then you had a blood bath in 
Russia. Stalin purged the Russian army, and I 
mean purged it, he killed them. . .he had to, to 
win. The secret police were reorganized four 
times. The purge of 1937 was something. He purged 
the red army. Oh, he took those officers, by the 
thousands. . .and got rid of them! Here, the best 
we do is move the man out of the army (sneering 
tone). . .we don’t kill them,..but there, they, 
they just kill them. One Russian general defected 
to the Germans and raised a million, one million 
Russian soldiers who didn’t like communism, think 
of it, one million. So the Russians counter­
attacked and lost fifteen million men and. . .
their brutality and everything along the way. . .
it was rough. They rule by force. The communists, 
in their invasion of Poland, with the help and aid 
of Germany, killed ten thousand Polish officers 
who were prisoners. . .and buried them. I'm talk­
ing more about the war than 1 am about Communism 
but it's all the same thing, the way they work.
They want to win, to rule.
I 24 : Well, let me interrupt you for a moment. 1 think
we are almost out of time at least for today and 
1 don't think we're anywhere near finished. . .





I'm Dan Rambo, an attorney here in Norman, and I'd 
like first to thank each of you for your cooperation in 
generously volunteering your time in coming here today.
What you all have been asked to take part in is an evalua­
tion of legal procedures, particularly the jury system in 
sanity hearings. It has been found that psychiatrists fre­
quently disagree on the sanity of the person being tried. 
For this reason, we are going to consider the possibility 
that juries might be able to arrive at more accurate deci­
sions if they have an opportunity to hear the actual psy­
chiatric interview for themselves. Today you all will hear 
a tape recording of a psychiatric interview, and then you 
will be asked to render an opinion as to the mental status 
of the person being interviewed. Now, Mrs. Helen Klein is 
going to be your general manager in this exercise so please 
assist her by being good and impartial jurors and following 
her directions.
Klein : In a jury trial you normally would hear the testi­
mony of expert witnesses. That is impossible in this situ­
ation; however, 1 can tell you that (appropriate prestige
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suggestion inserted). Please do not discuss the tape while 
it is being played or until further instructions are given. 
Simply listen to the tape as closely as you can and form 
your own opinion as to whether this person is sane or in­
sane. When the tape is over Mr. Rambo will give the jury 
instructions and you will be given a ballot on which to re­
cord your opinion. You are to mark only "sane" or "insane" 
on the ballot.
PLAY TAPE
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:
You are instructed that this matter comes on for 
trial on this date- In this case, a relative has filed a 
Mental Health Petition in a County Court wherein it is 
alleged that the person whom you have heard being inter­
viewed is afflicted with mental illness to such an extent 
that he is incapable of managing himself and his affairs 
and for his own welfare and the welfare of others, it is 
necessary or advisable for him to be under care.
NO. 2
The burden of proof is upon the Proponent, in this 
case, the State representing the relative who filed the 
Mental Health Petition, to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence facts sufficient to sustain the allegations 
in the petition, and unless the Proponent has proved these
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necessary allegations of the Petition by a preponderance 
of the evidence, your verdict must be for the Respondent.
NO. 3
You are further instructed that under the law of 
this State a person who is the subject of a Mental Health 
Petition has the right to Jury Trial on the sole question 
of his mental illness where he or some interested party 
requests that his sanity be determined by a Jury.
NO. 4
You are therefore instructed that should you find 
by a preponderance of the evidence presented to you for 
your consideration that this person is afflicted with men­
tal illness to the extent that he is incapable of managing 
himself or his affairs, and for his own welfare or the wel­
fare of others that it is necessary or advisable for him to 
be under care, then you shall so say by your verdict.
You are further instructed that should you find by 
a preponderance of the evidence presented to you for your 
consideration that this person is not afflicted with mental 
illness to the extent that he is not capable of managing 
himself or his affairs and that for his own welfare or the 
welfare of others, it is not necessary or advisable that he 




In determining your verdict in this case you may 
call to your aid such general knowledge and experience as 
you yourselves possess in common with all persons of gen­
eral, average intelligence. You should not let considera­
tion of sympathy, sentiment or prejudice enter into your 
deliberations, but should discharge your duties as jurors 
impartially, conscientiously and faithfully and return such 
verdict as the evidence warrants when measured by these in­
structions .
You may not use any method of chance in arriving 
at a verdict but base it on the judgment of each juror con­
curring therein.
You are not required to surrender your own judgment 
to that of any person testifying as an expert, or to give 
controlling effect to the opinion of an expert, for the 
testimony of an expert, like that of any other witness, is 
to be received by you and given such weight and value as 




Please tell us a few facts about yourself. You do 
not have to put down your name, therefore your anonymity is 





Education: Years attended grade school: High school
College :_______





1. Have you ever served on a jury before? yes no
2. If yes, what kinds of cases were being 
tried?
3. Were the jurors in those cases much the (Circle one)
same kinds of people you served with on
the jury today? yes no
If your answer was "no," in what way 
did they differ?
4. Did the jurors in those cases accept their responsibil­
ities as seriously as the jurors in today's proceedings?
Encircle the correct answer:
a. they were more serious
b. they were less serious
c. they did not differ from today's jurors
d. others (write in)  _________________________________
5. In general, were the jurors with whom you served before
as objective and impartial as the jurors with whom you
served today?




6 . In your own words, would you please compare and contrast
your experience on the jury today with your experience 
serving on previous juries.
Thank you for participating in this study.
APPENDIX E 
RAW DATA BY GROUPS
Prestige Suggestion
Insane Sane Conflicting None
Ss Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 1 Ballot 2
Group I Group III Group V Group VII
1 *S I I I S S *5 5
2 S S 5 S 5 5 5 5
I 3 I I I I 5 5 I 5
n 4 S I S 5 5 5 5 5
s 5 I I S S 5 5 5 5
a 6 I I S 5 5 5 I I
n 7 I I I I S S S 5e 8 I I s S S 5 S S
9 I I I 5 I S I S
10 I I *5 I 5 5 5 5
11 I I S S 5 S I S
12 I I I S *5 5 I 5
* *5=3 5=1 s=7 5 =8 5 = 11 5=12 S = 7 5 = 11* * * 1=9 1=11 1=5 1=4 1 = 1 1=0 1=5 1 = 1
Group II Group IV Group VI Group VIII
1 I I I 5 S 5 5 5
2 s I s S *5 S *5 S
3 s S s 5 5 5 5 54 s S s S 5 5 5 5
S 5 s S s S S S S Sa 6 s s s s 5 S 5 5
n 7 I s s 5 S 5 5 5
e 8 s s s 5 I 5 5 5
9 I I s S I I 5 5
10 I I *5 S 5 5 S S
11 *I I S S 5 S S S
12 s I s S 5 5 5 5
S=7 s =6 5=11 5 = 12 5 = 10 5 = 11 5 = 12 5 = 12
1=5 1=6 1 = 1 1 = 0 1 = 2 1 = 1 1=0 1 = 0
* =■Foreman * * S =Sane * * * j _Insane
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